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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reconciling the interrelationship between patent and antitrust law 
has long been a topic of concern to courts as well as to commentators. 
Antitrust law and intellectual property law are generally seen as being in 
conflict.1 Patent law is concerned with the creation and commercial 
exploitation of a statutory grant of monopoly power while antitrust law is 
concerned with proscribing various kinds of monopoly power. The Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
appeals and has decided cases in which patent law and antitrust law have 
intersected. Recent cases decided by the Federal Circuit have raised 
serious questions regarding the potential bias created toward patent rights 
                                                                                                             
 †  Seton Hall University School of Law, J.D. 2005; University of South Florida, B.S. 
2000.  Many thanks to Professor Marina Lao for her guidance and the staff of Seton Hall 
Circuit Review for reviewing prior drafts of this Comment.  Special thanks to my family 
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 1 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203-05 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(summarizing the conflict between intellectual property law and antitrust law) (“The 
conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that 
were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe 
unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor with a 
temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented 
art.”). 
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when crossed with antitrust restraints. Concerns were raised when the 
Federal Circuit developed its own interpretation of antitrust laws instead 
of applying regional circuits’ interpretation of antitrust laws when 
antitrust counterclaims are raised in patent litigation.2 A related concern 
is whether the Federal Circuit is exercising the role envisioned by 
Congress. With equal importance, the patent and antitrust laws are 
complementary and serve the public in different ways. 
This paper will argue that the Federal Circuit is correctly balancing 
the competing policies behind antitrust and intellectual property by 
applying its own choice-of-law rules when deciding whether patent 
litigation brought for the sole purpose of inflicting an anticompetitive 
injury can be the basis of antitrust liability. The Federal Circuit’s 
expansive interpretation of its jurisdiction over antitrust claims is 
appropriate and strikes a proper balance between patent law and antitrust 
law. This jurisdictional expansion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
precedent, Congress’s vision of uniformity, and the balance between 
patent law and antitrust law. The Federal Circuit has narrowed the 
choice-of-law to be applied when deciding antitrust issues in the patent 
enforcement context consistent with a proper balance of patent and 
antitrust laws. The difficulty which might arise from narrowing the 
choice-of-law rule is de minimis when compared to a more stable and 
uniform patent law and antitrust interplay. Finally, the Federal Circuit’s 
controversial decisions involving the intersection of patent law with 
antitrust law demonstrate the Federal Circuit’s ability to strike a proper 
balance between the two related and complementary areas. 
Section I of this paper will provide an overview of how the Federal 
Circuit was created and the cases that have developed the scope of the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. This section will demonstrate that the 
Federal Circuit may properly expand its jurisdiction into particular 
antitrust issues and remain within the jurisdictional scope intended by 
Congress. Section II will discuss the development of the Federal 
Circuit’s choice-of-law rules and cases that have expanded the scope of 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to apply to non-patent cases. Section III 
will analyze the choice-of-law principles and the implications of 
deciding antitrust counterclaims particularly after the Nobelpharma AB v. 
Implant Innovations, Inc.3 decision.  Section IV will demonstrate the 
practicality and sensibility of the Federal Circuit’s application of its own 
                                                                                                             
 2 Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Challenges of the New 
Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Remarks 
Before the American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov./ 
speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.htm) [hereinafter “Pitofsky Remarks”]. 
 3 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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law when deciding antitrust counterclaims and the consistency with 
Congress’s vision of the role of this court. 
II. THE EXPANSION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S JURISDICTION OVER 
CERTAIN ANTITRUST ISSUES 
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of and jurisdictional expansion over 
antitrust claims settle the confusing split of authority Congress attempted 
to combat when it created the Federal Circuit. Therefore, a discussion of 
the reasons for the existence of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is 
germane. Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to solidify the 
varying lines of patent law that were developing among the district 
courts. According to legislative history, the purpose of the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 19824 was to create a forum that would “increase 
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.”5 The Federal Court 
Improvement Act of 1982 sought “to reduce the widespread lack of 
uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the 
administration of patent law” by creating the Federal Circuit to hear 
appeals and set binding precedent in patent cases.6 The general 
jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit has been to apply its own substantive 
law to patent issues and the appropriate regional circuit law to non-patent 
issues.7 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution says that Congress 
shall have the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”8 Congress 
thus gave inventors the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the invention, without the consent of the patent owner, for a 
period of time.9 Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit to increase uniformity in patent law and to free the 
judicial process from forum shopping caused by conflicting patent 
                                                                                                             
 4 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West Supp. 2005). 
 5 The evidence compiled “singled out patent law as an area in which the application 
of the law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different courtrooms 
in substantially similar cases. Furthermore, in a Commission survey of practitioners, the 
patent bar indicated that the uncertainty created by the lack of a national law precedent 
was a significant problem . . . .” S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (footnote omitted), as 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15. 
 6 Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981)). Panduit includes an extensive discussion 
of the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit. 
 7 Id. at 1573. 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 9 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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decisions of the regional circuits. Congress’s objectives in creating a 
Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over certain patent cases were 
“to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal 
doctrine that existed in the administration of patent law.”10 Congress has 
stated that cases will be “within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in the same sense that cases are said to ‘arise 
under’ federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction.”11 
The jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), provides that where 
the jurisdiction of the district courts is based “in whole or in part, on 
section 1338 of this title,” the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of appeals from the final decisions of those district courts.12 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), the district courts have original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents.” Further, district courts have original 
jurisdiction over civil actions asserting unfair competition claims “when 
joined with a substantial and related” patent, trademark, or copyright 
claim.13 The Federal Circuit thus has exclusive power to review final 
decisions in cases where the jurisdiction was based at least in part on a 
claim arising under the patent laws. 
Commentators have argued that the phrase “based, in whole or in 
part, on section 1338,” could support several types of jurisdiction.14 
However, the Supreme Court in Christianson v. Colt Industries 
                                                                                                             
 10 Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574; Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 
800, 813 (1988) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981)). 
 11 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 41 (1981). 
 12 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005) provides: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of 
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the 
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, if the 
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of 
this title, except that a case involving a claim arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or 
trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a) shall be governed by 
sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title. 
 13 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(b) (West Supp. 2005). 
 14 See Judge Jon O. Newman, Tails and Dogs: Patent and Antitrust Appeals in the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 10 APLA Q.J. 237, 238-39 (1982). Judge 
Newman summarized three basic approaches to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction as (1) 
the traditional “arising under” jurisdiction if the claim (but likely not a defense) in the 
district court arose under the patent laws, (2) “case” jurisdiction where the entire case is 
appealable to the Federal Circuit if there was a patent issue in the case, regardless of 
whether the issue was raised as a defense or claim, and (3) “issue” jurisdiction where 
only the patent issue is appealable to the Federal Circuit while the remaining issues for 
appeal are heard by the applicable regional circuit. 
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Operating Corp.,15 limited the Federal Circuit’s broad appellate 
jurisdiction by applying the well-pleaded complaint rule. The plaintiff in 
Christianson brought an antitrust action alleging a concerted refusal to 
deal, i.e. monopolization and the restrain on trade in the relevant 
market.16 The defendant argued that any refusal to deal was justified 
under state trade secret law.17 However, the plaintiff anticipated this 
defense and included in its claim that the trade secrets were 
unenforceable since the secrets should have been disclosed in the 
defendant’s patents.18 The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the Federal Circuit, 
which in turn transferred the appeal to the Seventh Circuit pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1631 because the case did not arise under the patent laws.19 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction turns on whether the case arises under a federal patent 
statute.20 The Court further explained that Federal Circuit jurisdiction 
extends only to those cases where there is a well-pleaded complaint 
which establishes that either the cause of action or the right to relief 
depends on federal patent law.21 The Court reasoned that if the claim did 
not “arise under” the patent laws then the Federal Circuit lacks 
jurisdiction to decide the antitrust issue.22 In other words, the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction extends “only to those cases in which a well-
pleaded complaint” confers jurisdiction in the district court.23 Jurisdiction 
thus extends only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint 
establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or 
that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a 
substantial question of federal patent law.24 Therefore, Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred when the defense of federal question is 
raised and is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint. 
                                                                                                             
 15 486 U.S. 800, 807-13 (1988). 
 16 Id. at 804. Christianson alleged a number of theories and courses of conduct by 
which Colt had monopolized and restrained trade in the market for parts for the M16 
rifle. 
 17 Id. at 805-06. 
 18 Id. at 806. 
 19 Id. at 818. The Federal Circuit is, by this transfer statute, limited to a choice 
between two simple alternatives once it found it lacked jurisdiction. The court is to 
dismiss the case or transfer the case to a court of appeals that has jurisdiction. A court 
may not extend its jurisdiction where none exists, even in the interest of justice. See Vink 
v. Schijf, 839 F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 
515 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 20 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807. 
 21 Id. at 807-12. 
 22 Id. at 809. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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Christianson teaches that a court must look to the elements of the 
claims appearing on the face of the complaint and must determine 
whether patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded 
claims. A district court must therefore ascertain whether all the theories 
by which a plaintiff could prevail on a claim rely solely on resolving a 
substantial question of federal patent law. The Federal Circuit has stated 
that, under Christianson, a claim supported by alternative theories in the 
complaint may not form the jurisdictional basis unless patent law is 
essential to each theory.25 
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision that Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction extends “only to those cases in which a well-pleaded 
complaint” confers jurisdiction in the district court, the Federal Circuit 
has not interpreted its jurisdiction so narrowly. Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit anticipated the Supreme Court’s decision in Christianson when it 
decided Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.26 In that case, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that its appellate jurisdiction must be determined by 
reference to whether a claim in the underlying case “arises under” the 
patent statute.27 In Atari, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Congress 
designed the Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction “over appeals from 
decisions in ‘cases’ in which the district court’s jurisdiction ‘was based, 
in whole or in part, on Section 1338.’”28 Therefore, a case in the district 
court involving patent law and antitrust issues must be appealed to the 
Federal Circuit, even if the patent issues were already resolved in the 
district court and the only issue remaining is the antitrust claim or if the 
non-patent claims are tried separately in the district court and appealed 
without the patent claims.29 For example, in Korody-Colyer Corp. v. 
General Motors Corp.,30 the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal of a Walker Process claim31 after previously affirming a judgment 
that invalidated the patent. The Federal Circuit thus hears antitrust claims 
that would otherwise be heard by regional courts of appeals by broadly 
                                                                                                             
 25 American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810). 
 26 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 27 Id. at 1431-32. 
 28 Id. at 1429. 
 29 See id. 
 30 828 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 31 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965). As explained by the Supreme Court in Walker Process: 
The enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be 
violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to 
a § 2 case are present. In such event, the treble damage provisions of § 4 of 
the Clayton Act would be available to an injured party. 
Id. at 174. 
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interpreting its appellate jurisdiction. However, the court recognizes that 
“increased uniformity in the substantive law of patents does not require 
that this court get its hands on every appeal involving an allegation that a 
patent law issue is somehow involved.”32 
After Christianson, the Federal Circuit extended the well-pleaded 
complaint rule to include well-pleaded compulsory counterclaims. In 
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 33 
the defendant raised a compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement 
when the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of no misappropriation 
of trade secrets. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal in 
cases where the complaint was based on diversity and a compulsory 
counterclaim for patent infringement was present.34 The court reasoned 
that to hold that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction when a well-pleaded 
patent infringement claim is the basis of a pleading labeled “complaint” 
but not when the same well-pleaded claim is the basis of a pleading 
labeled “counterclaim” would seem incongruous.35 The right to file a 
counterclaim for patent infringement is unique to patent law and thus 
warrants a uniform national rule for the Federal Circuit to determine.36 In 
other words, it would be irrational to distinguish between complaints and 
counterclaims when determining the direction of an appeal to the Federal 
Circuit when the counterclaim arises under the patent laws.37 The Federal 
Circuit has concluded that a defendant may direct the appeal to the 
Federal Circuit by asserting a patent counterclaim, regardless of the 
claims in the complaint. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction 
over entire cases.38 Therefore, cases involving the patent laws are 
appealed to the Federal Circuit and the direction of appeal to the Federal 
Circuit does not change during or after trial, even when the only issues 
remaining are not within its exclusive assignment. In cases involving 
both patent and non-patent claims, the court has jurisdiction over the 
non-patent claims as well as the patent claims. This is in order to avoid 
creating fresh opportunities for forum shopping, to avoid bifurcation of 
issues and cases at trial and on appeal, to remove uncertainty and the 
                                                                                                             
 32 Atari, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1429. 
 33 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 34 Id. at 745. 
 35 Id. at 742. 
 36 See Vivid Techs. Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
The court did not decide what the result would be in the event the counterclaim was only 
permissive. 
 37 Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 742. 
 38 See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 n.3 
(2002) (reaffirming that the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction is over the entire case, 
not just patent issues on appeal). 
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abuses of procedural maneuvering, and to facilitate resolution of 
disputes.39 
The Federal Circuit’s extension of the well-pleaded complaint rule 
to include compulsory counterclaims is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Christianson. The Supreme Court has stated that a 
court may not extend its jurisdiction where none exists, even in the 
interest of justice.40 The Federal Circuit strictly construes its jurisdiction 
in harmony with its congressional mandate. Like all other federal 
appellate courts, the Federal Circuit is a legislative creation, deriving its 
power solely from a statutory mandate with limited jurisdiction.41 All 
federal courts have the duty to examine and determine their own 
jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit has inherent jurisdiction, as do all 
appellate courts, to determine its own jurisdiction and that of the tribunal 
from which the appeal was taken. The Federal Circuit’s AeroJet-General 
Corp. decision recognizes that the lack of appellate subject matter 
jurisdiction is a defect in the court’s authority to act and thus the case 
should be either dismissed or transferred to a court of appeals that does 
have jurisdiction.42 As the Aerojet-General Corp. court stated, “Congress 
anticipated the need for interpretation of [the Federal Circuit’s] 
jurisdictional mandate.”43 Acting within congressional mandate, the 
Federal Circuit may recharacterize pleadings that would improperly 
evade the intent of Congress. As the court noted, “the mere labeling and 
sequencing of pleadings in the trial tribunal cannot be allowed to control 
every exercise of this court’s appellate jurisdiction.”44 
It would clearly evade the intent of Congress and would clearly be 
irrational for the court to distinguish between complaints and 
counterclaims when considering the appropriate appellate path for patent 
claims. All courts have the duty to determine that an appeal is properly 
before it and the Federal Circuit shares this determination as well. The 
Supreme Court recognized this duty when it stated that the 
“determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgment 
about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”45 The 
Federal Circuit will follow the law as interpreted by the circuit in which 
the district court is located; however, such deference is inappropriate on 
issues of the Federal Circuit’s own jurisdiction. Unlike other courts, the 
                                                                                                             
 39 Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1435-41 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 40 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 803 (1988). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 739 n.5. 
 43 Id. at 739 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.  97-312, at 41 (1981)). 
 44 Id. at 740. 
 45 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 n.2 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 
478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)). 
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Federal Circuit does not have supervisory authority over district courts 
and may not reassign a case to another district judge, despite allegations 
of bias.46 Congress clearly intended for the Federal Circuit to hear well-
pleaded and non-frivolous patent law claims, both complaints and 
counterclaims, which arise under the patent laws, in order to maximize 
the court’s ability of achieving congressional objectives.47 Therefore, 
there is no conflict between a proper application of the Supreme Court’s 
well-pleaded complaint rule articulated in Christianson and the Federal 
Circuit’s determination that it “has appellate jurisdiction when a non-
frivolous well-pleaded compulsory patent law counterclaim is present in 
a case originally and properly filed in the district court.”48 The expansion 
of the scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to cover antitrust issues 
is consistent with Congress’s vision, Supreme Court precedent, and the  
balance between patent law and antitrust law. 
 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 
Before Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,49 the general 
jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit had been to apply its own 
substantive law to patent issues and the appropriate regional circuit law 
to non-patent issues. The Federal Circuit recognized that its exercise of 
jurisdiction over non-patent issues might result in the type of appellate 
forum shopping with which Congress was concerned. Many patent 
infringement suits involve antitrust issues which arise either in the 
context of patent misuse defenses or direct claims and counterclaims for 
violation of federal antitrust laws. In order to minimize forum shopping, 
the Federal Circuit applies the law of the “involved circuit” to issues 
which it normally has no jurisdiction. Accordingly, the district courts are 
obligated to “follow the guidance of their particular circuits” in all except 
those issues where the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.50 For 
example, in Atari, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed its 
patent. The district court enjoined the defendant from contributory 
copyright infringement in connection with the defendant’s sale of ink 
cartridges. The defendant appealed the copyright injunction to the 
Federal Circuit, which applied the law of the involved circuit to the issue 
                                                                                                             
 46 See Peterson Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“We do not sit to judge the character of district court judges.”). 
 47 See Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 744. 
 48 Id. at 741. 
 49 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 50 Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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because it was one which “normally possesses no jurisdiction.”51 The 
Federal Circuit recognized that district courts would be obligated to 
follow the guidance of their regional circuits in all but the substantive 
issues assigned exclusively to the Federal Circuit. 
The court further applied this rule when it decided Cygnus 
Therapeutics Systems v. Alza Corp. by applying regional circuit law to 
the antitrust claim before it.52 In Cygnus, a competitor alleged that a 
patent holder had violated antitrust laws and sought a declaratory 
judgment on the patent’s validity and enforceability. Alza owned a patent 
that stood as a roadblock in the way of the marketing and production of 
Cygnus’s product.53 Cygnus alleged a Walker Process claim54 against 
Alza asserting that Alza procured its patent through “deliberate fraud on 
the Patent Office” by misrepresenting prior art, which enabled Alza to 
obtain a patent which in turn stifled competition.55 The Federal Court 
affirmed the district court’s decision and found that Alza did not enforce 
its patent in an anti-competitive manner.56 In determining whether the 
district court correctly decided the issue in favor of Alza on Cygnus’s 
Walker Process claim, the Federal Circuit applied the law of the regional 
circuit in which the district court sits.57 In general, therefore, the Federal 
Circuit would approach a federal antitrust claim as would the regional 
court of appeals for the circuit that includes the district court whose 
judgment is being reviewed.58 
The Federal Circuit was cautious in its treatment of choice-of-law 
issues and generally avoided its discussion by merely deferring to the 
regional circuits. The choice-of-law rule articulated in Atari and applied 
in Cygnus was a prophylactic principle applied to prevent litigators from 
the forum shopping Congress envisioned. In order to minimize a constant 
transfer of appeals, and accordingly the amount of forum shopping, the 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. at 1436 n.12 (citing S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982)). 
 52 92 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 
861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“We must approach a federal antitrust claim as would a court 
of appeals in the circuit of the district court whose judgment we review.”). 
 53 Cygnus, 92 F.3d at 1160. 
 54 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965). 
 55 Cygnus, 92 F.3d at 1162. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1161 (“We must approach a federal antitrust claim as would a court of 
appeals in the circuit of the district court whose judgment we review.” (citing Loctite 
Corp., 781 F.2d at 875)). The court, in Cygnus, followed Ninth Circuit precedent on this 
issue. In the Ninth Circuit, “[w]ithout some effort at enforcement, the patent cannot serve 
as the foundation of a monopolization case.”  Cal. E. Lab., Inc. v. Gould, 896 F.2d 400, 
403 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court dismissal of a Walker Process claim where 
the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant “actually attempted to enforce the patents”). 
 58 Loctite Corp., 781 F.2d at 875. 
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Federal Circuit followed the guidance of the circuit court involved. 
Without the application of the Atari choice-of-law rule, litigants would 
have an opportunity to forum shop by providing an escape from the law 
of the involved circuit. 
The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule was changed after 
Nobelpharma was decided. Atari and Cygnus were overruled and the 
Federal Circuit no longer turned to the regional circuits for guidance with 
regard to all non-patent issues. After Nobelpharma, certain antitrust 
issues were decided without the guidance of regional circuit precedent. 
The Federal Circuit limited its own choice-of-law rules relating to certain 
antitrust issues. The court decided for the first time that “all antitrust 
claims premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit” would 
now be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law, even though 
antitrust law is not within its exclusive jurisdiction.59 Thus, in deciding 
whether conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a 
patentee of its immunity from antitrust laws, Federal Circuit law 
applies.60 This new choice-of-law rule applies to all antitrust claims 
premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit.61 In 
Nobelpharma, the patentee, Nobelpharma AB (“Nobelpharma”), brought 
an action for infringement of its dental implant patent against Implant 
Innovations, Inc. (“Implant”). Implant counterclaimed for antitrust 
violations based on the assertions that Nobelpharma attempted to enforce 
a patent it knew was invalid and unenforceable.62  The district court 
found that Nobelpharma did not have a valid patent and thus allowed the 
jury to hear only Implant’s antitrust counterclaim.63 The jury found that 
Nobelpharma’s patent was obtained through fraud on the Patent Office, 
that Nobelpharma knew that its patent was fraudulently obtained when it 
commenced the infringement action against Implant, and that 
Nobelpharma brought the infringement suit to intentionally interfere with 
Implant’s competition in the relevant market.64 The district court thus 
held Nobelpharma liable for violating the antitrust laws. 
                                                                                                             
 59 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1062. 
 63 Id. at 1063. Nobelpharma’s patent was invalid for failure to disclose the best mode 
when it did not list a 1977 publication as a reference. Id. at 1062. The evidence at trial led 
the court to believe that the inventor possessed a preferred method of making the claimed 
invention and failed to disclose it sufficiently to enable those skilled in the art to practice 
that method, as required by the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1065. 
 64 Id. at 1063. 
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Judge Laurie recognized case law 
precedent holding that when reviewing a district court’s judgment 
involving federal antitrust law, the Federal Circuit should be guided by 
the law of the regional circuit in which that district court sits.65 However, 
the Federal Circuit chose to overrule its precedent and held that “whether 
conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee 
of its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of 
Federal Circuit Law.”66 The court explained that an antitrust claim 
premised on stripping a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws 
is typically raised as a counterclaim by a defendant in a patent 
infringement suit and are frequently appealed to the Federal Circuit.67 
Judge Laurie continued by stating that the Federal Circuit was “in the 
best position to create a uniform body of federal law on this subject and 
thereby avoid the ‘danger of confusion [that] might be enhanced if this 
court were to embark on an effort to interpret the laws’ of the regional 
circuits,” and that this rule was to be applied to all antitrust claims 
premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit.68 The application 
of the Federal Circuit’s own law is limited, however, and when issues 
involving other elements of antitrust law which are not unique to patent 
law, such as relevant market, market power, and damages, the laws of the 
regional circuits are still applied.69 Therefore, in deciding whether 
conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee 
of its immunity from the antitrust laws, Federal Circuit law applies.70 
This conclusion applies equally to all antitrust claims premised on the 
bringing of a patent infringement suit.71 The Nobelpharma court 
therefore provided a clear test for defining what conduct tips the balance 
from inequitable conduct to fraud such that the patentee is stripped of his 
or her immunity from antitrust liability. 
                                                                                                             
 65 Id. at 1067 (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 
1985); Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 66 Id. at 1068 (“Accordingly, we hereby change our precedent and hold that whether 
conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity 
from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law.”). 
 67 Id. at 1067-68. 
 68 Id. at 1068 (citing Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 69 See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed Cir. 2000) 
(applying regional circuit law when evaluating conduct with respect to copyrighted 
diagnostic software). See also Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e should abandon our practice of applying regional circuit 
law in resolving questions involving the relationship between patent law and other federal 
and state law rights. Henceforth, we will apply our own law to such questions.”). 
 70 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. 
 71 Id. 
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The Federal Circuit had two reasons for ruling that infringement 
based antitrust lawsuits are to be decided as a matter of Federal Circuit 
law. First, most patent-related antitrust issues are counterclaims to 
infringement actions and will be appealed to the Federal Circuit 
anyway.72 Second, the court recognized that it is in the best position to 
create a uniform body of federal law on the subject of patent-related 
antitrust issues.73 In deciding Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit provided 
guidance for the analysis of patent misconduct affecting antitrust issues. 
By taking patent-related antitrust issues into its subject matter 
jurisdiction, the court provided coherence to the current debate on the 
proper balance between patent and antitrust law.74 Although it may seem 
strange for a federal district court judge not to be governed by the 
precedents of his or her own circuit court of appeals on antitrust issues, 
Congress intended this situation in the interest of promoting a uniform 
patent law. 
By having only the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decide 
questions on antitrust claims premised on the bringing of a patent 
infringement suit, Congress’s vision is preserved. It is within Congress’s 
vision to have patent issues decided by a court in the best position to 
create a uniform body of law. Nobelpharma is defensible because patent 
and antitrust laws are complementary – the patent system encourages 
invention and the bringing of new products to the market by adjusting 
investment risk; antitrust laws foster industrial competition.75 
Furthermore, the court pledged to continue applying the appropriate 
regional circuit law to antitrust issues that were not deemed related to the 
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction (issues not unique to patent 
law).76 The Federal Circuit’s decision to apply its own law to antitrust 
cases arising from infringement suits was motivated by the court’s intent 
to clarify federal jurisdiction over issues related to patent law. 
Nobelpharma creates a consistent jurisdictional authority over mixed 
cases of civil and patent law. Consistent jurisdictional authority will in 
turn lead to a uniform body of law. In conclusion, the Federal Circuit 
attempted to provide coherence to patent-related antitrust issues by 
providing guidance for the analysis of patent misconduct affecting 
antitrust issues and taking such cases into its subject matter jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                             
 72 Id. at 1067-68. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Deirdre L. Conley, Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209 (1999), for an analysis on how the Federal Circuit addressed 
the antitrust-patent relationship by providing a clear test to determine whether a patent 
owner should be stripped of antitrust immunity. 
 75 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 688-89 (5th ed. 2001). 
 76 See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. 
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The court’s Nobelpharma choice-of-law rule would serve the policy 
goals of Congress in enacting the Federal Courts Improvement Act, 
specifically, predictability in the patent laws through the creation of a 
uniform body of law.77 The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule 
articulated in Nobelpharma is necessary for the development of a 
uniform body of patent law. 
IV. STABILITY AND UNIFORMITY IN THE PATENT AND ANTITRUST 
INTERPLAY 
It has been argued that the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule 
“creates an unmanageable outcome because the court now applies its 
own law to issues that arise in cases over which it does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction.”78 For example, a district court faced with 
conflicting appellate authority with respect to the same issue must decide 
whether the appeal will be taken to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
or a regional circuit court of appeals to determine which law to apply. 
This difficulty may be illustrated by comparing the Supreme Court’s 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (“Kodak I”)79 
decision with the Federal Circuit’s In re Independent Service 
Organizations Antitrust Litigation (“Xerox”)80 decision and the Ninth 
Circuit’s Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak 
II”)81 decision. 
The Federal Circuit articulated the circumstances in which a patent 
holder may be held liable for violating the antitrust laws when exercising 
its patent rights in the Xerox decision.82 In Xerox, the antitrust plaintiff 
accused Xerox of refusing to sell its patented parts to independent 
service organizations that were competing to service and maintain Xerox 
copiers. The plaintiff claimed that Xerox’s conduct would eliminate 
competition in the service markets since the independent service 
organizations were being denied access to certain patented parts. The 
plaintiff alleged Xerox was violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act and 
the defendant counterclaimed for patent infringement.83 The Federal 
Circuit reconfirmed its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the 
                                                                                                             
 77 Id. at 1068 (citing Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 
1985)). 
 78 Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making Antitrust 
Law for the Whole Country?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 699 (2002). 
 79 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 80 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox 
Corp., 531 U.S. 1143 (2001). 
 81 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 82 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1326. 
 83 Id. at 1324. 
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restrictions antitrust law places on a patentee’s exercise of its patent 
rights.84 The court stated that the issue of “whether conduct in procuring 
or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from 
the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law.”85 
The court then enumerated the circumstances in which a patent holder 
may be held liable for antitrust violations. First, a patentee may be held 
liable if “the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful 
fraud within the meaning of Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. 
& Chem. Corp.”86 Second, the patentee may be held liable if an 
infringement suit was instituted and “the infringement suit was a mere 
sham to cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”87 Third, if the 
patent was used as a “tie” to extend market power beyond the patent 
grant (illegal tying), then the patent owner may be held liable.88 The 
court further stated that in the absence of any indication of illegal tying, 
fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent 
holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the 
antitrust laws.89 The court refused to inquire into the patentee’s 
subjective motivation for exerting his patent rights, “even though his 
refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an 
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not 
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant.”90 
The Federal Circuit chose to protect Xerox’s patent rights despite 
any anticompetitive conduct the antitrust plaintiffs were willing to show. 
The court held that Xerox’s conduct was not, as a matter of law, a 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. After this case, a patentee is 
essentially immune from antitrust liability for refusal to deal unless the 
antitrust plaintiff can show that (1) the patent was obtained by fraud on 
the Patent & Trademark Office (Walker Process-type claim); (2) the suit 
by the patentee was a “sham” as defined by Professional Real Estate 
                                                                                                             
 84 Id. at 1325. 
 85 Id. at 1325 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059,  
1068). 
 86 Id. at 1326 (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 
382 U.S. 172, 177). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 1327. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1327-28. The Federal Circuit expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s 
rebuttal-presumption rule that a patentee’s exercise of its statutory right to exclude others 
from using its work is a presumptively valid business justification that may be overcome 
by looking to the subjective intent of the patent holder. 
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Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”)91; or (3) the 
patent was used as a “tie” to extend market power beyond the patent 
grant. It is important to note that as required by the rule in Nobelpharma, 
the court applied its own law when it decided whether the refusal to 
license or sell patented parts constituted a violation of the antitrust laws. 
However, when the court evaluated that conduct with respect to 
copyrighted diagnostic software, it applied regional circuit law, since 
copyright law is not within the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court addressed the patent holder’s refusal to deal 
when it decided Kodak I, prior to the Federal Circuit’s Xerox decision.92 
In Kodak I, a manufacturer had a policy which limited the availability of 
replacement parts for its equipment which made it difficult for 
independent service organizations to compete. The independent service 
organizations brought an antitrust suit against the manufacturer. The 
Supreme Court noted that a patent holder could refuse to license, but 
such refusal was subject to a rebuttal presumption that refusing to license 
was harmful to consumers.93 The Court stated in a footnote that even if a 
manufacturer possesses “some inherent market power in the parts 
market, it is not clear why that should immunize them from the antitrust 
laws in another market.”94 This proposition was given a narrow 
interpretation by the Federal Circuit’s Xerox case where the court 
essentially held that a monopolist’s mere refusal to license will be upheld 
regardless of the subjective motivation of the patentee. The Ninth 
Circuit, on the other hand, has given this proposition a relatively broad 
interpretation when it decided Kodak II,95 on remand. 
                                                                                                             
91 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993). 
 92 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 93 Id. at 458. 
 94 Id. at 479 n.29. Footnote 29 states that: 
[E]ven assuming, despite the absence of any proof from the dissent, that all 
manufacturers possess some inherent market power in the parts market, it is 
not clear why that should immunize them from the antitrust laws in another 
market. . . power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a 
patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a seller 
exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the 
next.’ 
Id. At the time, however, intellectual property rights were not an issue before the court. 
See Jonathan Gleklen, Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Refusal to License Intellectual 
Property: Xerox and its Critics 6 (Spring 2001) (unpublished manuscript, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020501gleklen.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 1005)) 
(“[F]ootnote 29 can be characterized as dicta because the Kodak case did not involve the 
rights of intellectual property owners — the only evidence before the Court was that none 
of Kodak’s parts were patented.”). 
 95 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
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In Kodak II, a group of independent service organizations (“ISOs”) 
challenged Eastman Kodak’s practice of refusing to sell patented parts 
for its copiers to ISOs servicing its copiers.96 The ISOs claimed that 
Eastman Kodak leveraged “its monopoly over Kodak parts to gain or 
attempt to gain a monopoly over the service of Kodak equipment,” in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.97 The Ninth Circuit stated that 
“‘exploit[ing] [a] dominant position in one market to expand [the] empire 
into the next’ is broad enough to cover monopoly leveraging under 
Section 2.”98 The court further stated that “[n]either the aims of 
intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a 
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask 
anticompetitive conduct.”99 Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, the 
presumption of a valid business justification in refusing to license in 
order to exclude others from patented work may be rebutted by evidence 
of pretext, such as a showing of the monopolist’s state of mind or 
subjective motivations. The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s 
footnote 29 in Kodak I when it decided this case. Footnote 29 of Kodak I 
states that “power gained through some natural and legal advantage such 
as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a 
seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire 
into the next.’”100 However, intellectual property rights were not at issue 
before the Court in Kodak II because the defendant had not raised it.101 
Therefore, the footnote on which the Ninth Circuit relied when it decided 
Kodak II could be characterized as dicta. 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Xerox simply reaffirmed the 
principle that a patent owner has the right to grant exclusive or 
nonexclusive licenses or to sue for infringement without placing a 
restraint on trade. The grant of an exclusive license is a lawful incident of 
the right to exclude provided by the patent laws and a patent owner has 
the right to exclude and select its licensees. Patent owners do not have to 
license the use of their inventions.102 This principle conforms to a 
fundamental principle of antitrust law that companies are allowed to 
unilaterally choose with whom they want to conduct business.103 The 
                                                                                                             
 96 Id. at 1200. 
 97 Id. at 1208. 
 98 Id. at 1216 (quoting Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479 n. 29). 
 99 Id. at 1219 (citing Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 484). 
 100 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 
(citations omitted). 
 101 See Gleklen, supra note 94 (manuscript at 6). 
 102 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(4) (West Supp. 2005); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper 
Bag. Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). 
 103 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
324 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:307 
Xerox court correctly rewarded innovators by imposing antitrust liability 
only when the conduct in question is based on improperly seeking to 
expand on otherwise valid patent rights or when the conduct is based on 
an invalid patent claim. Because Xerox was decided in favor of the 
patentee, some in the antitrust community have perceived the court as 
giving undue deference to the principles of patent law. The former 
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Robert Pitofsky, expressed 
concern that recent cases have “upset the traditional balance in a way that 
has disturbing implications for the future of antitrust in high-technology 
industries.”104 However, it should be noted that the Federal Circuit 
sustained the district court’s antitrust verdict in Nobelpharma and did not 
find in favor of the patentee.105 
Another commentator has suggested that the Xerox decision 
expanded the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to antitrust law, where 
Congress never intended the Federal Circuit to have influence.106 
Notwithstanding the commentary of some noted antitrust scholars and 
practitioners,107 Xerox correctly draws the line between patent law and 
antitrust law. The respect that antitrust laws have towards the protection 
afforded to patents by the Constitution and the patent laws is 
demonstrated in Xerox.108 However, Section 2 of the Sherman Act may 
                                                                                                             
 104 See Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 919 (2001); see also Robert 
Pitofsky, Speech Before the Antitrust and Technology Conference, Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy (Berkley Ctr. 
L. & Tech., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Cal., Mar. 2, 2001), in 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 
545-46 (Spring 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf301.htm 
[hereinafter “Pitofsky Speech”]. 
 105 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 106 See Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, In Ruling on Antitrust, Does Federal Circuit 
Overstep?, 10/16/2000 NAT’L L.J. C20 (2000), http://www.mw-law.com/3.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2005). 
 107 See James B. Kobak, Jr., The Federal Circuit as a Competition Law Court, 83 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 527 (2001) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has taken a 
grudging view of antitrust principles and a broad view of patent rights) at 
http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=659; Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual?  
The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2000); see also Ronald Katz & 
Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making Antitrust Law for the Whole 
Country? 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 700 (2002); James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay 
of Patent Rights and Antitrust Restraints in the Federal Circuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
137 (2001). 
 108 See David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in 
Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-Litigation Claims, 10 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95 (2001) for a discussion and analysis on how the Federal 
Circuit correctly articulated the safety zone for the use of valid patents when it decided 
Xerox; See also Peter M. Boyle, Penelope M. Lister & J. Clayton Everett, Jr., Antitrust 
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prohibit a firm from unilaterally refusing to license their patent rights 
where such a refusal would allow the firm to obtain or maintain 
monopoly power by excluding competition in a way that does not benefit 
consumers.109 It is conceded that substantial antitrust claims were 
intended to be decided by regional courts of appeals under their 
governing legal interpretations, however a patent holder’s antitrust 
immunity is not stripped, according to the Federal Circuit, unless the 
conduct involves one of the three specific and limited patent-antitrust 
issues articulated in Nobelpharma, particularly when a party has asserted 
a Walker Process claim, a sham litigation claim, and/or an illegal tying 
arrangement.110 These issues are limited to when patent law issues need 
to be balanced. Furthermore, when the Federal Circuit applies its own 
law with regard to this patent-antitrust intersection, it limits itself and 
applies the regional circuit’s jurisprudence when analyzing the traditional 
elements of antitrust violations under the Sherman Act.111 
Therefore, although there may be conflicting authority on the same 
issues, depending on where an appeal will be brought, district courts 
need not despair. The Federal Circuit was given the authority and 
responsibility of adjudicating patent issues. A district court must adhere 
to Federal Circuit precedent in interpreting and applying patent law. At 
the same time, a district court is also required to respect the authority of 
its regional circuit court when interpreting non-patent specific issues. 
Because patent law is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal 
                                                                                                             
Law at the Federal Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust Intersection?, 
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739 (2002);  See also Simpson v. United Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 
(1964), where the Supreme Court addressed the tensions between the patent and antitrust 
laws and explained that, in the event of a conflict, the patent laws control. 
 109 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29 
(1992) (“Even assuming, despite the absence of any proof from the dissent, that all 
manufacturers possess some inherent market power in the parts market, it is not clear 
why that should immunize them from the antitrust laws in another market.”). 
 110 In Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit enumerated the circumstances in which a 
patent holder may be held liable for an antitrust violation. First, the court stated that a 
patentee may be held liable “if the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and 
willful fraud within the meaning of Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp.”  Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. Second, the patentee may be held liable if an 
infringement suit was instituted and “the infringement suit was a mere sham to cover 
what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.”  Id. Third, if the patent was used as a “tie” to extend 
market power beyond the patent grant (illegal tying), then the patent owner may be held 
liable. Id. See also Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 111 In further response to the proposition that the Federal Circuit will appropriate for 
itself elements of federal or state law, attorneys practicing in the Federal Circuit must 
proceed with caution as they must argue and brief many other issues as if they were 
appearing before the regional court of appeals for the circuit in which the case originated. 
Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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Circuit, and the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari, Nobelpharma 
is the rule of law. The application of the Federal Circuit’s Nobelpharma 
choice-of-law rule offers consistency and uniformity when addressing 
the issue of what conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent causes the 
patent owner to lose its immunity to antitrust laws. In reality, the district 
courts need not conduct a balance between patent and antitrust laws in 
order to determine which circuit courts’ law to apply – Nobelpharma 
articulates only three specific patent infringement-antitrust issues in 
which antitrust immunity is stripped from the patentee.112 
Congress sought to advance a clear, stable, and uniform basis for 
evaluating matters of patent validity and infringement so as to render a 
more predictable outcome of contemplated litigation, to facilitate more 
effective business planning, and to add confidence to investments in 
innovation and technology.113 As illustrated by the above cases that offer 
a mix of antitrust and patent claims, the predictability of the outcome 
may be problematic. However a strong adherence to the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdictional mandate articulated in Nobelpharma should lead to a more 
consistent patent infringement-antitrust jurisprudence. 
The Federal Circuit’s broad approach articulated in Xerox has been 
criticized by the former Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert 
Pitfosky, who stated that the Federal Circuit has unduly expanded the 
intellectual property grant.114 However, many commentators agree with 
the Federal Circuit’s approach and view the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak II 
decision as relying too much on the principles of antitrust law as opposed 
to intellectual property law.115 Xerox is correctly decided because the 
                                                                                                             
 112 See supra note 110. 
 113 See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 
736, 744 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. REP. 97-312, at 20 (1981)), which provides:  
The establishment of a single court to hear patent appeals was repeatedly 
singled out by the witnesses who appeared before the Committee as one of 
the most far-reaching reforms that could be made to strengthen the United 
States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and 
industrial innovation. The new Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit will 
provide nationwide uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied in 
patent litigation more predictable and will eliminate the expensive, time-
consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in the 
field. 
See also Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 744 n.7 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3-6 
(1981)), which noted that “[t]he committee is concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction 
over patent claims of the new Federal Circuit not be manipulated. This measure is 
intended to alleviate the serious problems of forum shopping among the regional’s [sic] 
courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of 
appeals.” 
 114 Pitofsky Speech, supra note 104, at 545-46. 
 115 See, e.g., Michael H. Kauffman, Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co.: Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling Intellectual Property 
2005] Antitrust Issues in Patent Law: Jurisdictional Expansion 327 
Federal Circuit rewards innovators by imposing antitrust liability only 
when the conduct in question is based on an invalid patent claim or 
improperly seeks to expand on otherwise valid patent rights.  The court’s 
limitations on imposing antitrust liability in the patent context are 
consistent with the long-standing relationship between antitrust and 
patent laws. The Ninth Circuit’s decision indeed limits a patentee from 
exercising patent rights if exercising it leads to a monopoly in a market 
for a product not claimed in the patent. However, in analyzing whether 
Kodak’s patent rights conferred upon it the right to exercise market 
power in the services market, the Ninth Circuit compared the literal 
scope of the patent claims with the scope of the relevant antitrust market 
to determine whether the economic market fell within the scope of the 
patent grant.116 On the other hand, the Federal Circuit focused on 
whether the patentee’s conduct fell within the scope of the patent grant, 
rather than the effects flowing from the conduct.117 In other words, under 
Xerox, “a patent may properly confer market power in multiple economic 
markets” so long as the patentee does nothing more than exclude another 
from making, using or selling a patented invention.118  The Federal 
Circuit’s approach seems to reflect a more realistic view of the 
relationship between a patent and the markets in which it creates power. 
A patent defines the scope of an invention and should not stand for the 
definition of a particular relevant market, thus the antitrust laws should 
not align patent rights into a particular relevant market. The Xerox case 
correctly demonstrates how the antitrust laws respect the long-standing 
protections afforded to intellectual property by Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution and the patent laws. The difficulty which may arise from the 
Federal Circuit’s Nobelpharma choice-of-law rule is de minimis in view 
of a more stable and uniform patent law and antitrust law interplay. 
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S TREATMENT OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS IN THE 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CONTEXT 
There has been concern regarding how well the Federal Circuit has 
handled situations in which antitrust principles and patent law have 
intersected.119 Recently-decided cases have raised questions regarding a 
possible bias created when patent rights and antitrust restraints cross 
paths. Some of this concern arises because antitrust development is being 
                                                                                                             
Rights and Antitrust Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471 (1999); See generally 
Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 108. 
 116 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d 1195, 1215-17 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 117 Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 118 See Boyle et al., supra note 108, at 755 n.68 (citing Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327). 
 119 Gambrell, supra note 107, at 148. 
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addressed by the protectors of intellectual property rights, the Federal 
Circuit. However, the Federal Circuit does not overreach its authority 
when it decides antitrust issues as they relate to patent enforcement 
because it does so in a well-balanced manner consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent and the role envisioned by Congress.120 
Most of the Federal Circuit’s encounters with antitrust issues 
involve either a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or 
counterclaims to patent infringement suits.121 These issues usually 
involve an accused patent infringer alleging antitrust violations in a 
counterclaim or a plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment of patent 
invalidity based on fraud procured on the Patent Office.122 A defendant 
may also raise a sham litigation claim alleging that a patentee is 
involving the courts to enforce its patent rights.123 Federal Circuit Judge 
Lourie in Nobelpharma stated: 
A patentee who brings an infringement suit may be subject to 
antitrust liability for the anti-competitive effects of that suit if the 
alleged infringer (the antitrust plaintiff) proves (1) that the 
asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful fraud 
within the meaning of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food 
Machinery & Chemical Corp., or (2) that the infringement suit 
was “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor.”124 
Because Nobelpharma cited to Supreme Court holdings when it 
mandated that Federal Circuit law applies to antitrust issues related to 
patent enforcement, it is important to briefly discuss the cases which 
have been the basis for the development of antitrust jurisprudence in the 
Federal Circuit. 
The Federal Circuit has remained faithful to the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & 
                                                                                                             
 120 Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 108, at 109. 
 121 See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd,  895 
F.2d 736, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction 
when the only patent claim is a non-frivolous compulsory counterclaim); DSC 
Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction when the only patent claim is a non-
frivolous permissive counterclaim). 
 122 See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 745; DSC Commc’ns, 170 F.3d at 1358-
59. 
 123 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 124 Id. (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127, 144 (1961)) (citation omitted). 
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Chemical Corp.125 and PRE126 when it examined antitrust issues in the 
patent enforcement context. The Supreme Court addressed antitrust law 
as it related to inequitable and fraudulent conduct before the Patent 
Office when it decided Walker Process.127 In PRE, the Supreme Court 
discussed sham litigation. The Court concluded that the fraudulent 
procurement and enforcement of a patent may be subject to a Walker 
Process-type claim.128 The bad faith enforcement of a patent known to be 
invalid or not infringed may be subject to a sham litigation claim.129 
Most antitrust claims in patent-related litigation are grounded upon these 
Walker Process and sham litigation claims.130 
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical 
Corp.,131 the Supreme Court decided that the enforcement of a patent 
which had been procured by fraud on the Patent Office may violate 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, so long as the other elements necessary to 
prove a Section 2 violation were also present.132 In Walker Process, the 
patent holder, Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. (“Food Machinery”) 
brought an infringement action against Walker Process Equipment, Inc. 
(“Walker Process”).133 Walker Process counterclaimed alleging that Food 
Machinery had fraudulently procured and enforced a patent, and, 
accordingly, illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.134 The Supreme Court decided 
in favor of Walker Process and for the first time held that enforcement of 
a fraudulently procured patent could give rise to antitrust liability.135 The 
antitrust liability of Walker Process is summarized as follows: an entity 
that defrauds the Patent Office should not be afforded the Constitutional 
protections of Article I, Section 8, and the patent laws in general.136 If 
those protections are lifted, the entity’s conduct may then be scrutinized 
under the Sherman Act. Walker Process requires the antitrust plaintiff 
                                                                                                             
 125 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
 126 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993). 
 127 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965). 
 128 See id. 
 129 See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 130 RICHARD G. SCHNEIDER, THE ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK IN PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 50 (Elizabeth Benton, et al. eds., American Bar Association 
1994). 
 131 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
 132 Under such circumstances, an injured party would be able to collect treble 
damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 2005). 
 133 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 173. 
 134 Id. at 174. 
 135 Id. at 177. 
 136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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(infringement defendant) to show fraud on the Patent Office as well as all 
the requirements for a Section 2 violation of the Sherman Act.137 
Under the choice-of-law rule articulated in Nobelpharma, the 
Federal Circuit’s law applies when deciding “[w]hether conduct in the 
prosecution of a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity 
from the antitrust laws.”138 Consequently, Federal Circuit precedent 
governs the analysis of the fraud-on-the-Patent Office aspect of Walker 
Process antitrust claims.139 In analyzing fraud on the Patent Office 
relating to omissions or misrepresentations, the fact omitted or 
misrepresented must be “‘the efficient, inducing, and proximate cause, or 
the determining ground’ of the action taken in reliance thereon.”140 The 
antitrust plaintiff (infringement defendant) must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence141 that the patentee committed fraud on the Patent 
Office when the patentee knowingly and willfully made a fraudulent 
omission and/or misrepresentation with a clear intent to deceive the 
patent examiner (intent element) and that the misrepresentation and/or 
omission was the “efficient, inducing, and proximate cause, or the 
determining ground” of the issuance of the patent, in other words, “the 
patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission” 
(materiality element).142 
The Supreme Court stated that: 
[A] patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest 
[and it] is an exception to the general rule against monopolies 
and to the right to access to a free and open market. The far 
reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, 
therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that 
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or 
                                                                                                             
 137 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78. 
 138 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 139 Id. at 1068. 
 140 Id. at 1070 (quoting 37 C.J.S. FRAUD § 18 (1943)). 
 141 See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 142 Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-71. Once the antitrust plaintiff raises sufficient 
questions of fact with regard to the Walker Process fraud elements of intent and 
materiality, the traditional elements of Section 2 violations of the Sherman Act must also 
be met. Since the traditional elements of Section 2 violations of the Sherman Act do not 
involve the patent laws, the Federal Circuit still follows the laws developed in the 
regional circuits when determining whether or not the antitrust defendant should be held 
liable. 
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other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept 
within their legitimate scope.”143  
Patent owners must therefore be permitted to test the validity of their 
patents in court through actions against alleged infringers.144 To avoid 
violations of the Sherman Act,145 patent holders must use care not to 
exceed the limits of power contemplated by Congress when it enacted 
the Patent Act.146 Patent owners must not use their patent rights as “a 
sword to eviscerate competition unfairly” otherwise they may become 
liable for antitrust violations when sufficient power in the relevant 
market is present.147 Therefore, a patent holder who enforces a 
fraudulently procured patent, uses patents to demand unreasonable patent 
licensing agreements, or brings “bad faith or sham enforcements of 
patents, may incur antitrust liability under Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman 
Act.”148 It is appropriate for the Federal Circuit to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the antitrust claims presented by Walker Process claims 
because the facts and elements involved in these claims involve strict and 
exact questions of patent validity, a subject matter reserved solely for the 
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has the optimum capability to 
balance the importance of patents with the importance of antitrust 
liability related to the fraud involved in the procurement of patents 
according to the Supreme Court’s holding in Walker Process. 
The use of the courts to enforce invalid patents is known as sham 
litigation. The Supreme Court, in PRE, adopted a two-part test to 
determine whether an intellectual property owner has engaged in sham 
litigation to enforce his or her rights.149  A sham litigation claim requires 
an antitrust plaintiff to plead and prove that the infringement suit was 
objectively baseless at the time the lawsuit was filed.150 Once this 
element is pled and proven, the second element requires proof that the 
suit was motivated by a subjective intent to abuse the litigation process to 
                                                                                                             
 143 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 
(1965) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
816 (1945)). 
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 148 SCHNEIDER, supra note 130, at 47. 
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interfere with the business of a competitor, rather than to obtain judicial 
relief.151 Once the elements of a sham litigation claim are proven, the 
antitrust plaintiff must still prove the traditional section 2 violations of 
the Sherman Act. Patent holders who initiate and conduct infringement 
actions in bad faith contribute nothing to the furtherance of the policies 
of either the patent law or the antitrust law.152 The Federal Circuit 
conducts a well-balanced analysis when it addresses the antitrust issues 
relating to enforcement of an invalid patent because it is examining 
issues of fact and law regarding the validity of patents. Under PRE, the 
test for sham litigation involves the determination of whether an 
intellectual property owner had probable cause to enforce his or her 
patent through the courts or tribunals.153 The Federal Circuit is the best 
circuit court to determine whether the alleged sham litigant owns a valid 
patent, i.e. the Federal Circuit is in the best position to determine patent 
validity. Furthermore, the traditional violations of the Sherman Act are 
analyzed under regional circuit law, not Federal Circuit law. It is 
certainly within the province of the Federal Circuit to apply its own 
analysis and precedent when it addresses the antitrust issues solely 
relating to patent invalidity. 
When the Federal Circuit hears antitrust issues relating to patent 
enforcement, it appropriately follows the precedent established in Walker 
Process and PRE to conduct a proper analysis. Assuming an antitrust 
plaintiff can present material issues of fact to show fraud on the PTO 
(Walker Process claim), or that the defendant filed an objectively 
baseless suit coupled with improper subjective motivation for bringing 
the claim (sham litigation claim), an antitrust plaintiff must plead and 
prove the traditional elements of an antitrust violation. Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States.”154 An antitrust plaintiff thus must prove the following elements: 
(1) a relevant market, (2) that the defendant (infringement plaintiff) “has 
                                                                                                             
 151 PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)). 
 152 See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984). Handgards 
was the first case to address sham litigation in the patent context. Handgards, Inc. 
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 153 PRE, 508 U.S. at 62. 
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engaged in predatory or [otherwise] anticompetitive conduct,” (3) that 
the defendant (infringement plaintiff) specifically intended to acquire 
monopoly power within the relevant market, and (4) that defendant 
(infringement plaintiff) has reached a dangerous probability that the 
attempt would be successful in achieving a monopoly in the relevant 
market.155 
Proponents of the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak II decision might critique 
the Federal Circuit’s Xerox analysis as being too protective of patent 
holders which may thus deter innovation by subsequent innovators. 
However, the Federal Circuit has not always protected patentees and has 
upheld district court decisions to strip patent holders of their rights, 
exposing them to antitrust violations. In Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. 
Swift Eckrich, Inc. (“Unitherm”)156, the Federal Circuit did not find in 
favor of the patentee when it determined whether the patentee was 
immune from charges of an antitrust violation, contrary to the view that 
the court is too pro-patent to be objectively neutral in deciding where 
patent rights end and antitrust law begins. The court recognized that the 
immunity from antitrust liability enjoyed by a patentee may be lost if 
fraud in obtaining or enforcing the patent is shown under Walker 
Process. In Unitherm, the plaintiff, Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. 
(“Unitherm”) sought declaration that the defendant, Swift Eckrich, Inc.’s 
(“Swift”) patent was invalid and further asserted monopolization and 
tortious interference claims.157 The court affirmed the district court’s 
summary judgment that Swift’s patent was invalid and unenforceable for 
prior use and prior sale under § 102(b).158 The Federal Circuit found 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the patentee knew of 
the prior use and thus obtained the patent through fraud on the Patent and 
Trademark Office. The court upheld the jury verdict stripping Swift of 
the antitrust immunity afforded patent holders. The Federal Circuit 
applied the Tenth Circuit’s Sherman Act analysis, however it held that 
the district court erred in allowing the jury to decide the plaintiff’s 
antitrust claims because the plaintiff failed to provide adequate economic 
evidence of the relevant market.159 
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Unitherm based its antitrust allegations on a Walker Process claim. 
As explained by the Supreme Court in Walker Process, the enforcement 
of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office “may 
be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements 
necessary to a § 2 case are present.”160 In such event the treble damage 
provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act would be available to an injured 
party.161 Once the court determined the patent was procured by fraud, it 
proceeded with the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in Walker 
Process. The court considered the exclusionary power of an illegal patent 
claim with respect to the relevant market for the product involved.162 The 
Federal Circuit stated that a Walker Process antitrust analysis can be 
framed by whether: (1) the patentee attempted to enforce the patent at 
issue; (2) the patent fraudulently issued; (3) the Walker Process claimant 
had antitrust standing (i.e., suffered antitrust damages); (4) the 
“attempted enforcement threatened to lessen competition in a relevant 
antitrust market;” and (5) “all other elements of attempted 
monopolization are met.”163  The court cited Nobelpharma and stated 
that the question of whether the Walker Process elements have been 
shown for purposes of stripping a patentee of its antitrust immunity must 
be decided under Federal Circuit law.164 The court added that the law of 
the regional circuit is applied to the elements of antitrust claims that are 
not unique to patent law, such as antitrust standing, market definition, 
antitrust injury and damages.165 The court stated that the Federal Circuit 
is “in the best position to impose uniformity on the patent laws” and 
decided the issues raised in the antitrust claim that were unique to the 
patent law under Federal Circuit law.166 Therefore, in determining 
whether the patentee attempted to enforce the patent at issue and whether 
the patent fraudulently issued, Federal Circuit law is applied and the law 
of the regional circuit, the Tenth Circuit in this case, is to be applied 
when determining whether the claimant had antitrust standing, the 
attempted enforcement threatened to lessen competition in the relevant 
                                                                                                             
 160 Id. at 1347 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172, 174 (1965)). 
 161 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 2005). 
 162 Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1355. 
 163 Id. at 1355. 
 164 Id. at 1356 (citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 
1067-68 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 165 Id. at 1356. 
 166 Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1356. 
2005] Antitrust Issues in Patent Law: Jurisdictional Expansion 335 
antitrust market, and whether the remaining elements of attempted 
monopolization are met.167 
Unitherm is yet another case that demonstrates how the Federal 
Circuit does not take a grudging view of antitrust principles and does not 
have a broad view of patentees’ rights to enforce and refuse to license 
their patents. The decision displays the Federal Circuit’s ability to strike 
the correct balance of the relationship of antitrust to intellectual property 
law. The court did not protect the patent holder from antitrust liability 
and found that the patent holder was enforcing an invalid patent. The 
Federal Circuit sustained the antitrust verdict by applying its 
Nobelpharma rule when it analyzed the elements of a Walker Process 
claim and applied the Tenth Circuit’s antitrust law to analyze the 
elements of a Section 2 violation. Thus, the court did not apply its own 
antitrust law, but instead applied the law of the regional circuit to find 
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that the patentee was liable under the Sherman Act. This case further 
proves that the Federal Circuit is not biased toward patent owners and 
instead has been able to reconcile the tensions between antitrust and 
intellectual property laws. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is an inherent tension existing between the assertion of patent 
rights and the restraints that antitrust imposes on any bundle of patent 
rights. It is unknown whether the debate between the two paradigms will 
settle, however allocating antitrust issues as they relate to patent issues to 
the Federal Circuit represents a warm turn toward a well-balanced 
compromise. Indeed, former chairman Pitfosky made a positive point in 
his speech to the American Antitrust Institute when he addressed the 
dividing line between patent rights and antitrust restraints. He stated that 
over the last century, antitrust and intellectual property are:  
[C]omplementary regimes, both designed to encourage 
innovation within appropriate limits. As a matter of policy, we 
are comfortable rewarding innovation through patents and 
copyrights so long as the compensation is not significantly in 
excess of that necessary to encourage investment in innovation, 
and the market power that results is not used to distort 
competition.168  
The recent Federal Circuit decisions certainly attempt to develop uniform 
principles to govern the relationship between patent rights and antitrust 
restraints instead of looking to antitrust precedents in the appropriate 
regional circuits. The Federal Circuit has done this in a way that properly 
balances the necessary encouragement of innovation with the need to 
prevent the impairment of competition and provides clarity to the 
principles of antitrust laws involving patent enforcement issues. As one 
commentator noted, “rather than siblings sharing a room, the two bodies 
of law are more like parents running a household. As with parents 
looking out for the best interest of the children, the guiding principle is 
the best interest of consumers.”169 Intellectual property owners should be 
rightfully entitled to claim the full scope of their property grant, and any 
activity within the scope of that grant should be permissible.  The 
Federal Circuit recognizes the common goals of antitrust law and 
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intellectual property law and is thus able to appropriately balance 
between the two regimes when it is faced with antitrust counterattacks in 
the patent infringement context. 
